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Abstract
The datafication and digitalization of health and medicine has engendered a proliferation of new collaborations between 
public health institutions and data corporations like Google, Apple, Microsoft and Amazon. Critical perspectives on these 
new partnerships tend to frame them as an instance of market transgressions by tech giants into the sphere of health and 
medicine, in line with a “hostile worlds” doctrine that upholds that the borders between market and non-market spheres 
should be carefully policed. This article seeks to outline the limitations of this common framing for critically understanding 
the phenomenon of the Googlization of health. In particular, the mobilization of a diversity of non-market value statements 
in the justification work carried out by actors involved in the Googlization of health indicates the co-presence of additional 
worlds or spheres in this context, which are not captured by the market vs. non-market dichotomy. It then advances an alter-
native framework, based on a multiple-sphere ontology that draws on Boltanski and Thevenot’s orders of worth and Michael 
Walzer’s theory of justice, which I call a normative pragmatics of justice. This framework addresses both the normative 
deficit in Boltanski and Thevenot’s work and provides an important emphasis on the empirical workings of justice. Finally, I 
discuss why this framework is better equipped to identify and to address the many risks raised by the Googlization of health 
and possibly other dimensions of the digitalization and datafication of society.
Keywords Digital health · Googlization of health · Commodification · Orders of worth · Spheres of justice · Datafication
Introduction
In recent years, the large consumer technology companies 
that have become the predominant architects of our digital 
environments have swiftly moved into the health and bio-
medical sector, positioning themselves as important facili-
tators of digital health and medicine. Apple’s ResearchKit 
software, for example, now allows medical researchers to 
carry out clinical studies using the iPhone and is currently 
being used by prominent medical institutions such as Yale, 
Stanford and Mount Sinai Hospital (Chan et al. 2018; Tura-
khia et al. 2019). Apple has also begun partnering with phar-
maceutical companies who see potential in the iPhone and 
Apple Watch for virtual “at home” monitoring and trials. 
Alphabet, Google’s parent company, is exploring ways to 
make its data collection and data analysis expertise useful 
for health too. In 2014, Verily, Alphabet’s life science divi-
sion, launched an ambitious project to “map human health” 
in collaboration with Duke and Stanford University. Verily 
is also partnering with European research institutes (Bloem 
et al. 2019) and working with pharmaceutical companies 
like Novartis and Pfizer on clinical trial development (Farr 
2019), while other Alphabet subsidiaries, such as Google 
and DeepMind, are developing AI for medical applications, 
with some recent successes in the prediction of cardiovascu-
lar disease, eye disease, and breast and lung cancer. Amazon 
is also showing growing interest in the health domain. In 
addition to the acquisition of an online symptom checking 
and triage tools company in 2019 and the development of 
a machine learning tool for the processing of unstructured 
medical texts, it has also entered a partnership with the UK’s 
NHS, which allows its Alexa voice-assistant to offer NHS 
health advice to users at home. A number of these compa-
nies have also recently begun moving into the domains of 
electronic health record management, employee healthcare 
and health insurance. With the outbreak of the COVID-19 
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pandemic in early 2020, moreover, Alphabet, Facebook, 
Apple and Microsoft were quick to develop COVID-19 
specific data collection tools, screening and testing facili-
ties, digital contact-tracing infrastructure and other COVID-
related research initiatives (see for example Kelion 2020 and 
Sharon 2020).
In line with the Googlization of earlier areas of human 
activity (Vaidhyanathan 2011),1 this Googlization of health 
(Sharon 2016) typically raises a series of apprehensions 
among critical scholars of digitalization and datafication. 
These include concerns about privacy and data protection, 
i.e. will these companies share personal data with advertis-
ers, insurers or employers (Zuboff 2019)? Concerns about 
the use of personal or publicly generated health data for 
financial profit, i.e. how will these companies monetize 
their investments in the health domain (Powles and Hodson 
2017, 2018)? Concerns about the new gatekeeping func-
tion these companies may have in accessing valuable health 
datasets, i.e. will the datasets they help generate be open 
to all (Boyd and Crawford 2012)? And concerns about the 
growing concentration of power of these private corpora-
tions in traditional public sectors like health and education 
(van Dijck et al. 2019; Prainsack 2020). These concerns are 
underpinned by an understanding that the Googlization of 
health, as a phenomenon that emerges at the intersection of 
digital capitalism and digital health, invokes an uncomfort-
able merging of what are often held to be by nature or by 
normative design separate spheres of human life—the mar-
ket and health. The economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer 
(2011) has called this framing the “separate spheres”, or 
the “hostile worlds”, doctrine: the idea that the market and 
other spheres of social life are, and should remain, separate.
This article seeks to outline the limitations of this com-
mon framing for critically understanding the phenomenon 
of the Googlization of health. In particular, it argues that 
additional worlds or spheres are intersecting in this con-
text, which signal a more comprehensive, multiple-sphere 
ontology, and the need for a broader analytical framework 
for identifying and addressing the many risks raised by the 
Googlization of health. In other words, while the hostile 
worlds doctrine sensitizes us to the risks caused by the intru-
sion of the market logic into the sphere of health and medi-
cine—which is an undeniable aspect of the Googlization of 
health—it does not do enough to identify the risks caused 
by the intrusion of logics from other spheres, which are co-
present in this phenomenon. The article proceeds as follows. 
The first part offers a brief overview of the hostile worlds 
doctrine as a long-established and prevalent framing in phi-
losophy, social theory, ethics and more recently critical data 
studies. It then discusses an important shortcoming of this 
framing when applied to the Googlization of health. Namely, 
numerous non-market values are prevalent in the justifica-
tion work carried out by corporate and other actors support-
ing the Googlization of health—including empowerment 
and equality, the democratization of knowledge, technical 
expertise and efficiency, health promotion and social good—
a situation which is not properly captured by the market vs. 
non-market dichotomy of the hostile worlds framing. Rather 
than viewing these justifications as non-market value state-
ments appropriated or co-opted for market aims, I suggest 
to view them as mobilizations of different “orders of worth” 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Sharon 2018). Not just the 
“market” and “civic” orders, but also the “industrial”, “pro-
ject”, “vitalist” and other orders. In the second part, I discuss 
the added value of this perspective up and against the hostile 
worlds doctrine, as well as some of its normative limita-
tions, which I address and improve on with Michael Walzer’s 
(1983) theory of justice. Finally, I show how this alternative, 
multi-sphere approach, what I call a “normative pragmatics 
of justice”, is better equipped to identify and address the 
many risks raised by the Googlization of health and pos-
sibly other dimensions of the digitalization and datafication 
of society.
The hostile worlds doctrine and its 
limitations
Separate spheres and hostile worlds: iterations 
in philosophy, (bio)ethics and critical data studies
The notion that social life is organized in distinctly different 
spheres, the market and the non-market sphere, which are 
each organized according to different and incommensurable 
principles, values and ends, has a long tradition in Western 
social theory and philosophy.2 It is also the theoretical archi-
tecture upon which public debate and cultural resistance to 
“putting a price” on things—from organs and embryos, 
to companionship, basic education, sex and waiting on 
line—takes place. As the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson 
(1990a, 1995) discusses in her account of the fundamental 
1 In his book The Googlization of Everything (2011), Vaidhyanathan 
identifies the “Googlization” of knowledge (books), memory, the 
world (the global sphere), and “us” (universal surveillance), though 
not the area of health, which in 2011 was still unchartered territory 
for Google. Drawing on Vaidhyanathan’s term to denote the expan-
sion of Google’s reach into ever more areas of social life, I also use it 
more broadly, to include the efforts of other tech corporations, such as 
Apple, Amazon, Facebook and Microsoft, whose initial interests also 
were not directed towards the health sector.
2 Hirschman (1982), for example, traces this notion back to the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, in critics of capitalism, both 
Marxist and conservative.
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differences between these two spheres, while the mode of 
valuation in the market sphere is use or utility, the non-mar-
ket sphere invokes modes of valuation including respect and 
appreciation. While the former is marked by impersonality 
or a freedom from personal ties and obligations, the latter is 
marked by an understanding of, and commitment to, others 
as part of a relationship. And while in the former goods are 
typically divisible (i.e. exclusive and rival), as is the case 
with commodities, in the latter they are typically shared: 
their worth lies at least in part in the fact that they are under-
stood to be held in common.
This “separate spheres” or “hostile worlds” doctrine 
(Zelizer 2011) does not only posit that the market and non-
market spheres are alien to each other, but that contact 
between them gives rise to moral contamination. That is, the 
application of market norms to goods that are best realized 
in the non-market sphere is not only seen as undermining the 
value of those goods, but as transforming them; corrupting 
and degrading them by treating them according to a lower 
mode of valuation than is appropriate to them (Anderson 
1990a; Sandel 2012). The market is here posited as an ever-
expanding and destructive force that displaces other, non-
economic modes of valuation and relations (Walzer 1983; 
Habermas 1984, 1987; Radin 1996; Caliskan and Callon 
2009; Satz 2010) and whose distinct normative reasoning 
risks seeping through every single dimension of human life 
(Foucault 2008; Brown 2015). Its borders, hostile worlds 
scholars argue, should thus be carefully managed—either 
by strengthening existing normative constraints that main-
tain certain goods outside of market relations, or by legal 
and institutional “blockages” (Walzer 1983). This defence 
of sphere separation has been particularly vehement in the 
domain of health and medicine (Anderson 1990b; Hoeyer 
2007; Scheper-Hughes 2000; Sharp 2000; Satz 2010; Tit-
muss 1970), where human life, and by extension bodies and 
body parts, are held to lie beyond economic calculation, and 
where healthcare and medical research are seen as goods 
at risk of moral degradation should they succumb to the 
rationale of the market.
More recently, the hostile worlds doctrine has also 
become a commonly deployed framing in critical data stud-
ies, the growing body of scholarship that studies the impacts 
of digitalization and datafication processes on society and 
culture from a critical perspective. In this iteration of the 
hostile worlds doctrine, data sharing practices are framed 
in terms of either private benefit and financial profit or pub-
lic benefit and social good. The notion of “digital labor” 
(Terranova 2000; Fuchs 2013), for example, has been para-
mount in this context. This term refers to the idea that the 
dominant model of capital accumulation of Internet corpo-
rations is based on the exploitation of users’ unpaid labor, 
who generate non-remunerated value for companies by 
creating content. On the one hand, scholars here denounce 
the commodification of data that are generated in non-mar-
ket spheres; for example, while searching for information 
online, while using mobile applications on a personal device, 
or while communicating and sharing on social media plat-
forms. On the other hand, they denounce the commodifica-
tion of data that are generated for non-financial benefits, 
such as socializing, sharing information to help similar oth-
ers, or contributing data for the improvement of public ser-
vices or research. Sphere encroachment takes place in two 
ways in this context. First, when commercial entities appro-
priate personal data that flow freely in the public domain 
and transform them into profit (see for example Pasquale 
2015; Zuboff 2019; van Dijck et al. 2019; Birch and Muniesa 
2020). Second, and often as a response to this appropriation, 
when property rights are assigned to personal data so that 
they can be monetized, where monetization is proposed as 
a means of redressing the asymmetry between corporations 
and individuals generating data in the data economy (Lanier 
2013; Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein 2019).
Expanding on this reading of the commodification of 
digital data, in the context of digital health data, the hostile 
worlds doctrine has been used to highlight the commodifica-
tion and exploitation for profit of, for example, patient expe-
riences shared online (Lupton 2014), genomic data shared 
for research (Harris et al. 2013; Sterckx et al. 2013), and data 
generated by apps used by individuals to track and monitor 
health-related activities (Ajana 2017; van Dijck et al. 2019). 
Lupton writes, for example, “just as other forms of digital 
prosumption have been expropriated by capitalist enter-
prises in the interests of profit … so too patient experience 
prosumption has generated new avenues for commercial 
endeavours by enterprises that have seen the opportunity 
for expropriating value” (2014, p. 864). Van Dijck et al. 
(2019), in their recent book on the platformization of vari-
ous sectors including health, speak of the “double promise” 
that platform operators intent on gathering personal health 
data employ: the promise of personalized solutions to medi-
cal challenges, but also the promise of public benefit and 
contributing to the common good of health research. Such 
critical studies often hone in on the discrepancy between the 
altruistic motivations of users sharing their health data and 
the commercial motivations of companies collecting data, 
where the latter’s mobilization of the lexicon of “sharing”, 
“doing good” and “philanthropy” facilitates a nonviolent 
intrusion of the market logic into a sphere of gift relations 
(Prainsack 2017). Here, much like Titmuss’ (1970) claims 
concerning blood donations, the commodification of health-
related digital data is seen as having a corrosive effect on the 
norms of sharing and donating data for altruistic purposes.
Understood within this long tradition of hostile worlds, 
the Googlization of health seems like a flagrant instance of 
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sphere contamination; of a novel encroachment, this time 
of the digital economy into the sphere of digital health and 
medicine. There are numerous benefits to applying this ana-
lytical framework to the Googlization of health. Namely, by 
situating the Googlization of health within the wider politi-
cal economy of digitalization, this framing importantly calls 
attention to the potential deleterious effects of commodifi-
cation of digital health that lie beyond privacy harms, such 
as harms to social justice, fairness and democratic control 
(Sharon 2018). That is, at a time when the regulatory and 
ethical vocabulary for addressing the negative impacts of 
digitalization is predominantly privacy and consent, the 
hostile worlds framing contributes to broadening this dis-
cussion to more collective values. However, and while this 
is an important shift, it is questionable how well the hostile 
worlds doctrine applies to the Googlization of health. In the 
following section I discuss a significant limitation posed by 
the Googlization of health to the hostile worlds doctrine, by 
focussing on the sphere-specific value qualification within 
the hostile worlds framing and comparing this to the moral 
lexicon used to justify the Googlization of health.
Sphere‑specific value repertoires
The dichotomy erected by the hostile worlds doctrine 
between the market and the rest, in addition to allocating 
specific goods, norms and practices to either spheres, also 
allocates moral values in this way. The tendency here is 
to situate most moral values, particularly those relating to 
the common good, within the non-market sphere, with the 
exception of two values which are seen as characteristic of 
the market: freedom and utility. Thus, the market is seen 
(both by proponents and hostile world critics), as a sphere 
where individuals are (purportedly) free, within the limits of 
the law, to pursue their own interests; to buy and sell what 
they please, be these apples or kidneys, cleaning services 
or sex. This is the libertarian moral argument in favor of 
markets (Nozick 1974). In addition, the market is under-
stood as a sphere where people are enabled to make mutu-
ally advantageous trades, and where successful commer-
cial transactions can bring benefits to all parties involved, 
thereby increasing general welfare, or social utility. This is 
the utilitarian argument in favor of markets, according to 
which, as Adam Smith (1776) posited, the pursuit of self-
interests in the market place frequently promotes, even if 
unintentionally, the interests of society.
While allowing for a certain morality of the market, 
albeit a limited one embodied in these values of market 
freedom and utility, theorists who ascribe to the hostile 
worlds framing tend to be very critical of it. For example, 
against libertarian arguments for markets, they question if 
market choices are always made freely or if some kind of 
coercion is exercised. Thus, people may be acting out of 
necessity when ceding to the sale of blood, body parts or 
other goods (Satz 2010; Sandel 2012). Against utilitarian 
arguments for markets, on the other hand, defenders of 
sphere separation maintain that the very attempt to weigh 
preferences without judging them, to measure all goods on 
a single scale, is flawed, because goods differ substantively 
in kind (Sandel 2012). It is precisely the attempt to valu-
ate some goods like economic ones that depreciates and 
corrupts them in this view.
The hostile worlds doctrine thus offers both a critique 
of the market in terms of its moral deficiency (most moral 
values are situated in the non-market sphere), as well as a 
compelling critique of those limited moral values which 
are held to be specific to the market. But does this cri-
tique and value qualification of spheres hold up in the case 
of the Googlization of health? One way of attempting to 
answer this is to take a close look at the value statements 
that are made by actors to justify the recent and increasing 
involvement of tech and data corporations in the field of 
health and medicine, or to carry out a “justification analy-
sis” of such statements, an approach for studying moral 
evaluations made in public debates, statements, and text-
based materials (Lehtonen and Liukko 2010; Ylä-Anttila 
and Luhtakallio 2016; Sharon 2018). Such a justification 
analysis, even a cursory one, indicates that statements 
made by corporate actors to justify their involvement in 
health and medicine do not typically mobilize market val-
ues (freedom and utility), but non-market values. These 
values include empowerment and equality—understood 
in terms of a democratization of medical knowledge for 
patients; data expertise and efficiency—understood here 
not as market efficiency (the matching of preferences of 
two parties in a market exchange), but as the streamlining 
of the onslaught of health data the medical community 
needs to handle; and social value—which these corpora-
tions claim to contribute by addressing some of society’s 
most pressing challenges, including healthcare. Impor-
tantly, and as will be further discussed below, this is not 
to say that these justification statements should be taken 
at face value as either the true motivations of these actors 
or as a description of what actions are being carried out in 
this context. Rather, these indicate a discrepancy between 
the sphere-specific value repertoires identified in the hos-
tile worlds framing and those mobilized in the phenom-
enon of the Googlization.
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Examples of the presence of non‑market values 
in the justifications for the Googlization of health3
Empowerment and equality are common values that are 
drawn upon by corporate actors in this context. For example, 
in an interview on Apple’s health strategy, the company’s 
Vice President of Health, Dr. Sumbul Desai, explains that 
“democratizing data” is one of the company’s main aims. 
Discussing the recent ECG function added to the Apple 
Watch in 2019, she says, “we think that empowering a cus-
tomer and really democratizing the information for a cus-
tomer to use (…) so that they can engage in their health 
more effectively is what we’re trying to do (...) By putting 
the ECG in someone’s hand (...) it’s really a way for you to 
engage with your physician in a different way” (in Comstock 
2019). Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, has also emphasized the 
democratization of medical data as one of Apple’s aims: 
“We are democratizing it [data]. We are taking what has 
been with the institution and empowering the individual 
to manage their health” (Cook 2019). While this appeal to 
democratization and empowerment may be understood as an 
invocation of the value of freedom, what is being invoked 
here is not the market value of freedom as “exit”, but the 
political value of freedom as “voice” (Hirschman 1970).
In addition to empowering patients and citizens, the data 
expertise of these companies is advanced as an important 
contribution in an age of digital and data-driven health and 
medicine. If Google’s mission statement has always been to 
“organize the world’s information and make it universally 
accessible and useful”, Verily, Alphabet’s life sciences sub-
sidiary, has a similar, data-driven health-related mission, to 
“make health information useful so people can live healthier 
lives”. Indeed, according to Verily’s chief medical officer, 
Jessica Mega, the one thread that unites the company’s vari-
ous health-related projects is information. As clinicians, 
patients, and providers of health services are confronted with 
exponentially growing datasets, she explains that Verily’s 
value lies in offering the tools to manage and streamline 
these data: “What we’re trying to do […] is to stay ahead 
of the infrastructure you need to handle this next wave of 
data” (in Brodwin 2019). Similarly, in a blog post announc-
ing Verily’s recent partnership to launch an opioid addiction 
treatment center in the US, Verily’s contribution is framed 
in terms of “addressing the critical information gap” (Verily 
2019) that exists in addiction medicine, by tapping into their 
capabilities and expertise in building health data platforms. 
Providing more efficient ways of gathering, managing and 
analyzing data is touted by most of these companies as their 
direct contribution to health and medicine, from providing 
the “essential capabilities necessary to help clients drive 
their digital transformations: deep industry expertise, data 
and analytics, and actionable insights” (IBM Watson Health 
n.d.), to using technology like an iPhone to increase patient 
enrollment and thus increase data collection (Apple n.d.).
An explicit and recurrent principle in the justification 
statements found here is the generation of social value and 
contributing to the common good, by addressing society’s 
most complex challenges—including healthcare. This dif-
fers from more traditional forms of philanthropy, by which 
wealthy CEOs donate parts of their fortunes to social causes 
including research into various diseases and public health 
projects. These types of philanthropic efforts are also being 
undertaken by leaders at tech corporations, for example in 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or the more recent 
Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, which has pledged to spend $3 
billion over the next decade to support scientific research 
(Love 2016). But a number of key initiatives in the Goog-
lization of health diverge from this traditional understanding 
of philanthropy on two dimensions. First, creating social 
value is presented as the main aim and expected general 
impact of what these companies do.4 And second, this con-
tribution is channeled specifically through the technical 
expertise that these companies provide—not their financial 
resources.
Demis Hassabis, for example, founder of DeepMind, 
Google’s AI offshoot, discusses how technology will likely 
be more successful than humans at advancing societal good:
If you look at the challenges that confront society 
today: climate change, sustainability, mass inequal-
ity—which is getting worse—diseases and healthcare, 
we’re not making progress anywhere near fast enough 
in any of these areas. Either we need an exponential 
improvement in human behavior (…) or we need an 
exponential improvement in technology. If you look 
at current geopolitics, I don’t think we’re going to be 
getting an exponential improvement in human behavior 
any time soon. That’s why we need a quantum leap in 
technology like AI. (in Heath 2018)
For Tim Cook, Apple’s uniqueness lies in the company’s 
clear motivation to “change the world” and to “be a force of 
good”, by focusing on “what will help people, rather than 
3 A number of the examples presented here are taken from the 
broader justification analysis carried out in Sharon (2018). The mate-
rial used there included interviews, conducted by myself or made 
public, with stakeholders involved in the Googlization of health (such 
as industry representatives, scientists at public research institutions 
partnering with or open to partner with tech corporations, patients 
and policy makers), promotional material, and policy reports on digi-
tal health, AI, and public–private partnerships.
4 This first dimension resembles what has been coined “philanthro-




what will make the company money” (in Lashinsky 2017). 
This holds for the company’s recent interest in health as 
well. Cook explains that, while health is certainly a lucra-
tive market, many of Apple’s health-related initiatives are 
not profit-driven. Speaking of the ResearchKit software for 
example, he says: “There’s no business model there. Hon-
estly, we don’t make any money on that. But it was some-
thing that we thought would be good for society and so we 
did it” (in Lashinsky 2017). Indeed, in an interview given 
a couple of years later, Cook went as far as to claim that he 
expects Apple’s “greatest contribution to mankind” to be in 
health (Cook 2019).
Other values that have been identified in statements and 
promotional material of these companies include innova-
tion and trouble-shooting—that is seen as being brought to 
bear from the outside on a convoluted, lethargic and overly 
bureaucratic healthcare and medical system; inclusivity 
and diversity—by allowing more individuals to participate 
in medical research via consumer technology devices; and 
solidarity—enabled by the platforms that promote data shar-
ing between citizens and patients and medical researchers 
(Sharon 2018).
Framed within the hostile worlds doctrine, such a mobi-
lization of non-market values by market actors is typically 
understood as a rhetorical ploy, used to lure unsuspecting 
individuals to donate their health data for what is presented 
as societal good but actually aims to enhance corporate 
profit. It is precisely this deceptive and exploitative feature 
which is captured by the notion of “free digital labour” 
referred to above. To be sure, instrumental uses of non-
market values for market aims are a reality in the age of 
digital capitalism, as are some forms of digital labour. Fur-
thermore, promotional materials and interviews do not, of 
course, communicate actual decision-making processes, nor 
do they provide access to the authentic or real motivations 
of actors. The difference between what is said and what is 
done can be vast.
However, there are several reasons to push back against 
this type of explanation for the presence of non-market 
justifications for the Googlization of health as too quick. 
First—and while it is questionable if the “real” motivations 
of actors are ever accessible to observers—these materials 
do convey something about the scope of possibilities for 
action, especially in relation to concrete technology design. 
In this sense they may certainly contribute to the shaping 
and guiding of decision-making processes and technological 
futures, making them to some extent performative (Austin 
1962; Foucault 1970; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Verbeek 
2005). Moreover, as I shall outline below, mapping out these 
different moral justifications can be very helpful for identi-
fying which decision-making processes and actions are to 
come, and what risks they entail. Finally, value statements 
drawing on non-market moralities in order to justify the 
involvement of data corporations in health and medicine are 
also common among non-corporate actors in this context. 
For example, the technical aptitude of these companies is 
often invoked by medical scientists. Thus, in the study pro-
tocol of the Personalized Parkinson Project, a partnership 
between Verily and Radboud University Medical Center in 
the Netherlands, one reads that Verily’s “analytics capabili-
ties” are expected to help researchers to “address research 
questions of great scientific and clinical value” (Bloem et al. 
2019, p. 8). In relation to the Apple ResearchKit, a Duke 
University scientist states that “[w]e’ve gone as far as we 
can with traditional research. Now we have technology in 
our pockets that lets us go even further” (Apple n.d.). In 
addition, the value of the creative and innovative approach 
these companies bring to healthcare is also echoed in state-
ments made by medical professionals, policy makers and 
hospital managers. Speaking of Amazon’s recent interest in 
geriatric health, for example, one physician claims, “Health 
care—especially for seniors—is at its breaking point and is 
ripe for disruption (…) what Amazon has figured out is that 
to provide high-quality health care for seniors, physicians 
must be innovative” (Schayes 2018). Similarly, claims to 
patient empowerment and participation, as a result of these 
corporations seeking to “meet customers where they are” 
(Brodwin 2020), and seeking to develop design features that 
enable altruistic data sharing with researchers (Wilbanks and 
Friend 2016), have also been identified by medical scientists, 
tech analysts and non-profit scientific organizations com-
menting on these developments.
In other words, the justifications that warrant the involve-
ment of these corporations in the health and medical sphere 
are not limited to justifications drawn from the market 
sphere, and this points to a discrepancy between the sphere-
specific value qualification of the hostile worlds framing and 
the moral lexicon of the Googlization of health. Rather than 
explaining the presence of these non-market moral orienta-
tions at work in the Googlization of health by pigeonholing 
them solely as statements that have been appropriated for 
market aims, a framework that moves beyond the hostile 
worlds doctrine is needed.
Towards a multi‑sphere ontology 
and a normative pragmatics of justice
Orders of worth and the plurality of common goods
A fruitful way forward here is to view these value state-
ments as representative of what the French sociologists 
Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have called “orders 
of worth” in their seminal work On Justification (2006). 
Orders of worth are coherent vocabularies of argumentation 
and justification that are organized around different visions 
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of the common good and of what is just. They are general 
grammars of social order or political bonds oriented toward 
justice, which people appeal to when in situations of (non-
violent) conflict. That is, when they need to justify their 
positions and actions, or when they are criticizing the posi-
tions of others. For each order, one fundamental or “higher 
common principle” helps demarcate that which is valuable 
or good from that which is of lesser worth.
Thus, statements that emphasize the data management 
expertise that these companies provide to the health and 
medical sector as something valuable and worthy draw on 
what Boltanski and Thévenot call an “industrial” order of 
worth. The industrial order distinguishes between func-
tionality and professionalism as valuable and chaos and 
unproductivity as worthless. Conversely, statements that 
emphasize the democratization of medical information, just 
as statements that emphasize doing good for society, draw 
on what the authors call a “civic” order. In the civic order, 
the common good is conceptualized in terms of social value 
and collective benefit and values like solidarity, equality and 
participation are foregrounded. Statements that emphasize 
“thinking out of the box”, “disruption” and a novel approach 
to health and medicine that these companies bring from the 
outside draw on a “project” order (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005). Here the common good is conceptualized in terms 
of innovation, and emphasized values include experimenta-
tion and activity as opposed to stagnation and prudence. 
In On Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot identified six 
orders of worth based on their analysis of contemporary 
French corporations, to which two additional orders have 
been supplemented in further work, for a typology of eight 
ideal types of justification. In addition to those mentioned, 
also a “market” (enhanced wealth creation and utility), a 
“domestic” (familial ties and tradition), an “inspired” (crea-
tivity and uniqueness), “fame” (public recognition), and a 
“green” (ecology) order (Moody et al. 2000).
This typology is characterized by both a radical plural-
ism—there is a diversity of ways of specifying the common 
good—and what we might call “non-relativism”—this radi-
cal pluralism does not result in moral relativism.5 In terms 
of the latter, moral relativism is averted in this framework 
because there is not an infinite number of orders of worth. 
Indeed, insofar as these orders are brought to work in situ-
ations where people are attempting to justify themselves, 
that is, to persuade others of the goodness of their actions, 
these orders need to be recognizable to others. “When one is 
attending to the unfolding of disputes,” they write, “one sees 
that they are limited neither to a direct expression of inter-
ests nor to an anarchic endless confrontation between het-
erogeneous worldviews clashing in a dialogue of the deaf” 
(2006, p. 13). This prerequisite of recognizability means that 
orders of worth only make sense in light of some shared 
understanding of justice, which in turn implies that orders of 
worth are historical and contingent—specific for a particular 
society at a given time. Orders of worth can thus vanish and 
they can emerge. The “project” and the “green” orders that 
Boltanski, Thévenot and colleagues identified in subsequent 
works, for example, have been identified as emergent orders. 
Similarly, in the justification analysis of the Googlization 
of health that I carried out (Sharon 2018), I identified the 
order of “vitality”, organized around the value of health as 
a higher common principle, as an emergent and frequently 
mobilized order of worth in this context.6
More than the avoidance of moral relativism however, 
it is the first feature of this typology which is of particular 
interest here: the radical plurality of orders of worth. Bol-
tanski and Thévenot’s main line of reasoning is that societies 
are made up of an interweaving of multiple understandings 
of justice and forms of agreement. This pluralism allows us 
to move beyond the hostile worlds doctrine in several sig-
nificant ways, and thus offers fertile ground for a framework 
that would be better equipped to address the risks involved in 
a phenomenon like the Googlization of health. First, where 
the hostile worlds doctrine applied to the Googlization of 
health sees only the market and the non-market spheres, the 
framework of orders of worth allows for a much more com-
plex moral landscape, where multiple orders are co-present. 
This framework can thus account for a broad diversity of 
value orientations that seem to be at work in a phenomenon 
like the Googlization of health.7 Furthermore, where the 
hostile worlds doctrine situates the common good primarily 
5 This limited pluralism, or pluralism without relativism, gives rise 
to some tension of course. Namely, the question of how plurality is 
possible when legitimacy seems to require universality (2006, p. 39). 
This tension is resolved in the “polity model” that the authors develop 
in On Justification, a set of axioms or binding conditions which any 
order of worth must satisfy in order to be constituted as such.
6 The order of vitality is particularly interesting in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic outbreak which took place during the time of 
writing, and during which public health became a common justifica-
tion for using technology to address the pandemic, often up against 
civic justifications around privacy and other civil rights. See for 
example the justification analysis conducted by Siffels (2020) of the 
public debate on the development of contact-tracing apps.
7 This goes further than some recent scholarship that suggests that 
we are witnessing a merging of social and financial profits in con-
temporary capitalism in ways that the hostile worlds doctrine funda-
mentally misses (see for example McGoey 2015 and Prainsack 2017). 
This scholarship is helpful in moving beyond the strict separation at 
the heart of the hostile worlds framing, but still falls short of iden-
tifying multiple orders and spheres. Prainsack, for example, argues 
that current health entrepreneurism is the result of new convergences 
between social and financial value—but only of these two modes of 
valuation. I argue that beyond these new convergences of two types of 
value, additional ones are also at stake, complicating a phenomenon 
like the Googlization of health even more.
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in what Boltanski and Thévenot would call the “civic” order 
of worth, which foregrounds solidarity and inclusion, in Bol-
tanski and Thévenot’s framework the civic order does not 
have a monopoly over the common good and other moral 
values. Rather, each and every order of worth is grounded 
in some conception of the common good; each one advances 
a model of agreement and justice. In other words, even the 
market order—whose pool of available values is limited at 
best to the values of market freedom and utility in the hostile 
worlds framing—qualifies as an order which provides a rich 
and meaningful sense of justice grounded in a conception 
of the common good and provides a moral orientation to 
action. It too requires that persons, in order to be considered 
worthy, sacrifice individual interests for a collective. They 
write, “moral capacity is presupposed in the construction of 
an order of market exchanges among persons, who must be 
capable of distancing themselves from their own particulari-
ties in order to reach agreement about external goods that 
are enumerated and defined in general terms” (2006, p. 27). 
In other words, in comparison to the hostile worlds fram-
ing, this framework offers both additional orders, as well as 
additional conceptualizations of the common good.
Addressing Boltanski and Thévenot’s normative 
deficit
The orders of worth framework, however, is a descriptive 
one. While it is useful for identifying numerous orders of 
worth that may simultaneously be at work, it does not offer 
any critical evaluation of these different orders (all common 
goods are equally worthy), and it does not provide tools for 
making normative claims about the mobilization of one or 
another order in different situations. To resolve this norma-
tive deficit, Michael Walzer’s theory of justice can be useful.
In Spheres of Justice (1983), Walzer develops a theory of 
justice based on the autonomy of spheres within a multiple 
sphere ontology. Social life, according to Walzer, is organ-
ized into different spheres—the market, politics, welfare, 
education, etc.—in which different social goods are distrib-
uted according to different principles of justice. A just soci-
ety, Walzer maintains, is one where advantage in one sphere 
cannot be converted into advantage in another. Wealth, 
for example, an advantage procured in the market sphere, 
should not translate into better education, better medical 
care or political influence. Just as having political power, 
for example holding office, should not translate into ben-
efits in these other spheres. Such illegitimate conversions, 
or transgressions between spheres, as many hostile worlds 
theorists would also argue, can lead to a loss of meaning 
of those goods which succumb to the distributive logic of 
the wrong sphere. An additional, and perhaps greater risk 
for Walzer, thinking in terms of a multiple and not just a 
dual sphere ontology, is the accrual of advantage or power 
across all spheres, a situation in which inequalities align 
across spheres and which Walzer calls “tyranny”. Walzer’s 
theory of justice thus provides a theory of justice by which 
to critically evaluate the conversions or intrusions in a mul-
tiple sphere setting, which the orders of worth framework 
does not.
Bringing Walzer into conversation with Boltanski and 
Thévenot is not coincidental. The French sociologists 
acknowledge that Walzer’s Spheres of Justice was an impor-
tant inspiration for their work on the orders of worth. They 
write, “This pluralism [of orders] brings our position close 
to the one developed by Michael Walzer and, as it did for 
Walzer (…) it led to our interest in a theory of justice that 
would take into account the diversity of ways to specify a 
common good” (2006, p. 14). And both Walzer and Boltan-
ski and Thévenot acknowledge one of seventeenth century 
philosopher Pascal’s (1966) pensées as an earlier source of 
inspiration for the idea that there are different orders or log-
ics, and that the attempt to dominate regardless of these dif-
ferences is a form of “tyranny”. Still, the two frameworks 
differ importantly, a point it is useful to linger on in order to 
understand the added value that each of these frameworks 
can bring to the study of a phenomenon like the Googliza-
tion of health.
First of all, orders of worth are not the same as “spheres”, 
in the sense that either Walzer or hostile worlds framings 
appeal to different spheres. Orders are more like repertoires 
or discourses—articulations of practices and values that give 
order to, or that are specific to, a sphere. Thus, the civic 
order can be understood as an articulation of the practices 
of the sphere of democratic politics, the domestic order an 
articulation of the practices of the sphere of family relations, 
etc. In this sense, the same sphere may be organized along 
the requirements of different orders. Family life and house-
holds (the “sphere of the family”) may be run “civically” 
(like democracies, with one vote per family member), or 
“industrially” (like an efficient factory), or more “domesti-
cally” (like a patriarchy); just as factories may be run civi-
cally, industrially or domestically, etc.8
Secondly, and related to this, the orders of worth frame-
work can be seen to some extent as a critique of Walzer’s 
theory of justice: Boltanksi and Thévenot were critical of the 
abstract and universalizing tendencies of moral philosophy. 
Indeed, Boltanski and Thévenot developed their framework 
as both a critique of, and a means of bridging, moral or 
political philosophy and sociology. For them, while moral 
philosophy focuses too much on abstract principles of jus-
tice, typically universalizing ones, sociology—at least the 
school of Bourdieusian, critical sociology that dominated 
in French scholarship at the time they were writing—fails 
8 I thank Andrew Hoffman for help in elucidating this point.
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to take seriously individuals’ sense of justice.9 Their frame-
work seeks to address each of these lacunae. First, by shift-
ing from discussing abstract principles of justice to exam-
ining empirical situations of agreement and disagreement. 
Secondly, by following the arguments and criticisms of 
actors without reducing these to power and ideology. This, 
they argue, is a means of investigating the “situated sense 
of the just” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2000, p. 216, emphasis 
added).
This emphasis on what we may call the pragmatics of 
justification, can allow for a more precise and heedful atten-
tion to how orders of worth travel between spheres: while 
Walzer’s spheres can be understood as institutions, orders of 
worth are more ambulatory, flexible (two or more orders are 
often combined in a justification), and adaptable to specific 
situations. Coupled with the normative evaluation of sphere 
transgressions provided by Walzer’s theory of justice, this 
pragmatics of justification—or now a normative pragmatics 
of justice—may allow us to better identify various “micro” 
transgressions and illegitimate importations and conversions 
of orders of worth into spheres. And not just from the market 
sphere into the sphere of health and medicine, but from all 
other spheres as well.
A new line of inquiry
Such a normative pragmatics of justice can open up a whole 
new line of critical inquiry. It enables the formulation of 
questions such as: which sphere transgressions and impor-
tations of orders of worth are detrimental, and which ones 
can be beneficial and lead to ethical innovation? Which ones 
contradict the traditional values of a sphere and why and 
where is this problematic? Which ones are solely instrumen-
tal to realizing the values of a sphere, and which ones risk 
crowding those values out?
Novel risks, which may be specific to the phenomenon 
of the Googlization of health but may also be implied in the 
broader process of the digitalization of health and of soci-
ety, can then be identified and described. For example, we 
can begin to ask, “what happens to the sphere of health and 
medicine when the civic order of worth becomes dominant 
or hegemonic?” The civic order of worth, with its appealing 
emphasis on inclusivity, rights, reciprocity and democracy, 
is a very popular one in contemporary liberal societies, dear 
to both liberal enthusiasts and critical scholars. In the con-
text of health and medicine, a rise to prominence of the civic 
order of worth has been identified by many scholars in the 
form of the so-called “participatory turn”, new emphases on 
patient autonomy and empowerment, and more equal rela-
tionships between experts and patients (Eysenbach 2008; 
Prainsack 2014; Topol 2015). Above, we have also seen that 
data corporations moving into health and medical research 
also frequently mobilize the civic order of worth to justify 
this involvement. But in the sphere of health and medicine, 
this rise of the civic order of worth has developed along-
side a devaluation of the domestic order of worth, typically 
associated with paternalism, unequal relationships between 
doctors and patients and the exploitation of research partici-
pants. While this devaluation of the domestic in favour of 
the civic brings with it important ethical benefits, it will also 
come at a price, insofar as the domestic order of worth also 
foregrounds the values of caring, watching over vulnerable 
others, and trust. For example, how will the prominence of 
the civic affect the focal practice of medicine as the provi-
sion of care (Mol 2008)? How will clinicians and researchers 
fulfil the new obligations of “giving back” that reciprocal, 
civic relationships with their patients and research partici-
pants entail? And in terms of the value of personal data 
for medical research and care, to what extent will a civic 
order of worth transform the sharing of personal data into 
a moral duty, for example in new calls for “data solidarity” 
(Rathenau 2020)?
Conversely, what happens when a vitalist order of worth, 
that views health as the higher common principle, becomes 
dominant in the sphere of health and medicine? To a large 
extent, the vitalist order, in combination with the domestic, 
has always been the dominant order of worth of the sphere 
of health and medicine. But the prominence of this order can 
also legitimize practices that risk undermining values from 
other orders. Ubiquitous, constant health (self-)monitoring 
via mobile apps, virtual medical assistants and health maps, 
for example, may well lead to more preventive and person-
alized medicine and better health outcomes, as proponents 
uphold (Steinhubl et al. 2013; Topol 2019). But it also cur-
tails individual autonomy and privacy. The prominence of 
the vitalist order may also legitimize the presence of data 
corporations and their contributions to healthcare and med-
ical research while downplaying the various costs of this 
involvement—in terms of the market price the public sector 
may need to pay for the treatments and services that these 
corporations will develop, or in terms of a loss of democratic 
control over health data as a public resource.
What risks, moreover, does the industrial order, which 
frames health and medicine as problems of data manage-
ment, pose to the sphere of health and medicine? Does this 
9 Boltanski developed his “sociology of critique” in response to 
Bourdieusian “critical sociology”, which he saw as being based 
on trying to unveil the “real” motivations and desires of people and 
explaining them in terms of habitus and structure, with the result of 
developing a problematic asymmetry between the critical researcher 
and actors who were presented as being steeped in illusion (Boltanski 
et al. 2014). Instead, the sociology of critique implies engaging seri-
ously, and symmetrically, with different justifications. Incidentally, 
this is in line with the plea made earlier not to dismiss the non-market 
value statements made in the context of the Googlization of health as 
rhetorical and inauthentic from the outset.
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lead to a redefinition of who counts as a medical expert? 
How does this influence how medical knowledge will be pro-
duced in the future? How will this reshape the work routines 
of healthcare professionals and scientists? And how will 
this determine who has a say in shaping research agendas? 
When the industrial order becomes dominant in the sphere 
of health and medicine, the expertise of data corporations 
moves from being a purely technical expertise to an exper-
tise in health and medicine, that legitimizes their initiation 
of research projects, possibly at the cost of research into dis-
eases that they find less valuable. Alphabet, for example, has 
recently become involved in Parkinson’s research at several 
levels, in the form of 23andMe’s Parkinson’s Genetics Ini-
tiative and the Personalized Parkinson’s Project mentioned 
earlier. This particular interest in Parkinson’s research has 
coincided, as has been openly spoken about, with Sergey 
Brin’s discovery that he carries a form of hereditary Parkin-
son’s disease (Goetz 2010).
The importation and rise to dominance of any order of 
worth will present risks, in the form of trade-offs and the 
undermining of values prominent in competing orders of 
worth. These need to be carefully scrutinized and weighed. 
But more than any other type of encroachment, it is perhaps 
the importation and growing prominence of a specific type 
of industrial worth into the sphere of health and medicine—
in the form of expertise in data collection, analysis and infra-
structure—which presents the most dangerous conversion 
we are witnessing today. It is by means of their technical 
expertise that data corporations are becoming necessary pas-
sage points in health and medicine, and all other sectors of 
society that are undergoing digitalization. A recent example 
of this can be seen in the contribution that Apple and Google 
made to the global COVID-19 pandemic response in April 
2020, by developing a platform for automating and running 
digital contact-tracing apps. As a platform that became the 
API that almost all countries developing contact-tracing 
apps in the end adopted—even when the platform’s decen-
tralized protocol conflicted with the initial preferences of 
some countries to have centralized systems—Apple and 
Google succeeded in de facto shaping how contact-tracing 
would be carried out in the digital age, and thus determin-
ing an important component of global public health policy. 
In this instance, their technical expertise, or their industrial 
worth, to use the framework expanded in this paper, enabled 
them to encroach into the spheres of both public health and 
global politics (Sharon 2020).
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that the hostile worlds doc-
trine, an age-old framing prevalent in social theory, politi-
cal philosophy, (bio)ethics and more recently critical data 
studies, has limited value in the context of the Googlization 
of health. This is not to say that it has no value: it is help-
ful in broadening critical perspectives on this phenomenon 
beyond the narrow lens of privacy harms, insofar as it situ-
ates this phenomenon within the political economy of data 
and the commodification of health data. But it is insufficient 
for identifying risks of conversion from other non-market 
spheres and possible new forms of what Walzer called “tyr-
anny” that the Googlization of health introduces. A mani-
festation of this limitation can be found in the discrepancy I 
highlighted between the sphere-specific value qualification 
of the hostile worlds framing and the moral lexicon found in 
public justifications legitimizing the Googlization of health. 
Here, value statements made by both corporate and non-
corporate actors involved in the Googlization of health con-
sistently draw on values from numerous non-market spheres. 
Rather than dismiss these statements as deceptive or co-
opted, I suggested that this justification work is an indication 
of the co-presence of multiple spheres and the need for an 
analytical framework that can account for this multiplicity.
Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework of orders of worth, 
which assumes a plurality of orders each organized around 
a different conception of the common good, provides a use-
ful alternative. Here multiple orders of worth, in addition to 
the “market” and the “civic” order, interweave within any 
given society and each of these, including the market order, 
are characterized by different moral orientations towards the 
common good. There is a certain normative deficit in the 
orders of worth framework, however, which I suggested can 
be resolved by drawing on Walzer’s theory of justice as the 
autonomy of spheres in a multi-sphere ontology. Combined, 
these frameworks provide what I called a normative prag-
matics of justice, that bring together both a keen, empirical 
attention to travelling orders of worth and their deployment 
in different spheres, and a critical and normative evaluation 
of importations and conversions of orders of worth. This 
framework opens up a new line of inquiry into the Googliza-
tion of health and allows us to identify many risks that the 
hostile worlds framing, with its focus on market encroach-
ments, remains blind to, in the form of civic, industrial, 
vitalist or other importations and conversions into the sphere 
of health and medicine.
Importantly, both Boltanski and Thévenot’s and Walzer’s 
frameworks imply a historical contingency that is valuable 
in the case of a novel phenomenon like the Googlization of 
health. These ontologies indicate a dynamic interaction of 
orders and spheres, where different orders and spheres may 
be dominant in different historical periods. While Boltanski 
and Thévenot speak of the disappearance and emergence of 
new orders of worth, Walzer understands the history of liber-
alism as the erection of boundaries between spheres, and in 
particular the placing of proper limits on the political sphere, 
to limit the reach of government. If this is liberalism’s 
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greatest achievement, according to Walzer, at the time he 
developed his theory of justice he had become concerned 
with growing transgressions from the market sphere, to 
which liberalism seemed to him less sensitive. “We need 
to look closely,” he warns, “at the ways in which wealth, 
once political tyranny is abolished, itself takes on tyrannical 
forms” (1984, p. 321). The lines between spheres, in other 
words, need to be constantly redrawn. Similarly, with the 
Googlization of health and other sectors of society, includ-
ing education, news provision, and city planning, we may be 
facing new transgressions from existing known spheres as 
well as transgressions from new and emergent spheres that 
a focus on commodification and commercialization do not 
do enough to sensitize us to. As I have argued, we should 
in particular be wary of a new industrial tyranny, by which 
technical expertise, especially in the form of data expertise, 
translates into an asset worthy of conferring power in non-
industrial spheres, such as the sphere of health and medicine, 
but also the sphere of politics. The challenge, in what may 
be a new historical configuration of spheres largely being 
redefined by the processes of digitalization and datafication, 
is to redraw the lines and define new limits of convertibility 
in ways that secure justice in our contemporary moment.
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